In case you missed The New York Times Magazine article, "Darwin's God," here's a summary:
There's a debate becoming more vociferous between two schools of thought relating to naturalistic (scientific) explanations of religious belief.
One school of thought sees religious belief as a byproduct of evolutionary adaptations relating to cognitive abilities of homo sapiens. The other school sees religious belief an adaption itself--that is an evolutionary development that itself increases the chance for survival, not a result of other adaptations that once increased or now increase (or both) the chance for survival.
Proponents of the former--byproduct theorists--include geneticist Richard Dawkins of Cambridge University and anthropologist Scott Atran (photo at left). Proponents of the second--adaption theorists--include evolutionary biologist David Sloan Wilson (photo below) of SUNY Binghamton.
For byproduct theorists, specifically religious belief (unlike language) is not itself a biological adaption, but other more basic cognitive functions are. For them:
The bottom line is that children are born with a tendency to believe in omniscience, invisible minds, immaterial souls--and then they grow up in cultures that fill their minds, hard-wired for belief, with specifics..... [W]e are born with an innate tendency for belief, but the specifics of what we grow up believing--whether there is one God or many, whether the soul goes to heaven or occupies another animal after death--are culturally shaped.
Or as Atran put it, religious thought involves "a family of cognitive phenomena that involves the extraordinary use of everyday cognitive processes."
The more basic, "everyday," cognitive functions include:
1. Agent detection. For example, as a caveman you are benefited by an ability to presume and engaging in the presumption that
the motion you detect out of the corner of your eye is an agent and something to run from.... If it turns out to have been just the rustling of leaves, you are still alive; if what you took to be leaves rustling was really a hyena about to pounce, you are dead.
2. Causal reasoning, that is, our ability to "impose a narrative, complete with chronology and cause-and-effect logic, on whatever [we encounter], no matter how apparently random." And
3. Theory of mind (a.k.a., "folkpsychology"), "an understanding of ordinary people’s ordinary minds," that is, an understanding that other minds do exist beyond your own, and an understanding of what they're more or less likely to be thinking.
For adaption theorists, specifically religious belief is a biological adaptation: religion either once did or currently does (or both) offer a survival advantage.
One possible complication for the adaption theory is that it presumes that "group selection" is a mechanism of evolution--that is, it argues that evolution is operative not only at the level of an individual organism's chances for survival and, thus, the passing on of its genes, but also at the level of groups of individuals' chances for survival, and that there are ways at the level of a group by which an individual's chances for survival can be enhanced.
This argument relating to religion and group selection notes that, yes
[t]here are costs to any individual of being religious: the time and resources spent on rituals, the psychic energy devoted to following certain injunctions, the pain of some initiation rites. But in terms of intergroup struggle...the costs can be outweighed by the benefits of being in a cohesive group that out-competes the others.
Adaptionists also see survival benefits, from religion, that would depend upon language.
If a particular selfless trait enhances a person’s reputation, spread through the written and spoken word, it might give him an advantage in many of life’s challenges, like finding a mate.
This sort of group selection theorizing even opens up the possibility that
a mixture of hardheaded realists and symbolically minded visionaries is most adaptive and that “what seems to be an adversarial relationship” between theists and atheists within a community is really a division of cognitive labor that “keeps social groups as a whole on an even keel.”
Many basic observations stemming from research are agreed upon by adaption and byproduct theorists. For instance, that
when we think about being dead, we run into a cognitive wall. How can we possibly think about not thinking? “Try to fill your consciousness with the representation of no-consciousness, and you will see the impossibility of it,” the Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno wrote in “Tragic Sense of Life.” “The effort to comprehend it causes the most tormenting dizziness. We cannot conceive of ourselves as not existing.”
And that the "idea of an infallible God is comfortable and familiar, something children readily accept" and many adults, too, in part because: 1. god, as a concept, is a "minimally counterintuitve" agent (i.e., god is somehow not utterly unbelievable, unlike what studies show some other ideas to be--such as a "tree that talks and flies and time-travels"), and 2. the concept of god usually contains an emotional component insofar as the concept of god is associated with "the natural heightening of emotions that occurs in times of personal crisis.... [such as] when someone comes face to face with mortality" or the emotional component stirred up through religious ritual.
The article concludes:
No matter how much science can explain, it seems, the real gap that God fills is an emptiness that our big-brained mental architecture interprets as a yearning for the supernatural. The drive to satisfy that yearning, according to both adaptationists and byproduct theorists, might be an inevitable and eternal part of what Atran calls the tragedy of human cognition.